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This study compares the impact of OSHA inspections on manufacturing industries using data
from three time periods: 1979-85, 1987-91, and 1992-98. We find substantial declines in the impact of
OSHA inspections since 1979-85. In the earliest period we estimate that having an OSHA inspection that
imposed a penalty reduces injuries by about 15%; in the later periods it falls to 8% in 1987-91 and to 1%
(and statistically insignificant) in 1992-98. Testing for different effects by inspection type, employment
size, and industry, we find differences across size classes, but these cannot explain the overall decline.
In fact, we find reductions in OSHA’s impact over time for nearly all subgroups we examine, so shifts
across subgroups cannot explain the whole decline. We examine various other hypotheses concerning
the declining impact, but in the end we are not able to provide a clear explanation for the decline.
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Congress established the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) in 
1970 to prevent occupational injuries and illnesses, and there has been considerable debate 
since then over the effectiveness of the program.  OSHA does tens of thousands of 
inspections, and imposes millions of dollars in penalties each year, but most workplaces are 
only rarely visited, penalties are low relative to the cost of abating many workplace hazards, 
and many injuries are unrelated to OSHA standards. 
Many empirical studies examining OSHA have found little evidence of an impact on 
injuries (e.g. Smith (1979), Viscusi (1979, 1986), McCaffrey (1983), Bartel and Thomas 
(1985), Ruser and Smith (1991)).  By contrast, a series of studies by Scholz and Gray found 
significant impacts, using a large plant-level database for the 1979-85 period.  Depending on 
the analytical technique used, having an OSHA inspection which imposed a penalty was 
associated with a 15-22% decline in injuries over a three year period (Scholz and Gray 
(1990), Gray and Scholz (1993)). 
The present study extends these analyses to more recent years.  To the 1979-85 
dataset used by Scholz and Gray we add a 1987-91 dataset created earlier by one of the 
authors (Gray (1996)), and a final 1992-98 data set created for this study.  Although there 
are some differences in sample composition across the three data sets, we use the same 
variables and analyses for all three data sets to make the results as comparable as possible. 
  We find that the average impact of OSHA inspections on changes in injury rates has 
declined substantially over time, especially in the most recent data set, where the overall 
impact is no longer statistically significant.  Using our basic model, the point estimate of the 




late 1980s and about 1% in the 1990s.  Models which include all OSHA inspections (with 
and without penalties) show smaller impacts, but these impacts also decline across the three 
periods. 
We looked for different impacts across various subgroups: inspection types, 
establishment sizes, and industries.  We do observe smaller impacts in the largest 
establishments.  However, we observe declines over time in the impact of OSHA 
inspections on injuries within nearly all subgroups we examine, although the declines occur 
to different degrees and at different times.  The paper also examines a variety of possible 
explanations for the decline in impact, but we aren’t able to provide a clear explanation for 
the decline.   
  The following section of the paper provides some background on the determinants of 
occupational injuries and OSHA’s activity.  Section 3 discusses the data and some 
econometric issues affecting the analysis.  Section 4 presents the results, and Section 5 
summarizes the findings. 
 
2. Background and Theory 
 
  Figure 1 shows the injury rate per 100 full-time manufacturing workers from 1972 to 
1999.  The numbers are based on reporting to the annual Survey of Occupational Injuries 
and Illnesses, conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).  The “lost workday case 
rate” is divided into two categories:  cases with days away from work and cases with only 
restricted work activity.   The rate for all lost workday cases changed relatively little from 




fall in recessions and increase in booms, primarily because of the changes in the number of 
newly hired, inexperienced workers (Robinson (1988)).  However, in the 1990s the 
manufacturing injury rate dropped by about 25% despite continuous prosperity during those 
years. We also see in Figure 1 that the rate of injuries with restricted work activity rose 
substantially after the mid-1980s while the rate for cases with days away from work 
accounted for the decline in the 1990s (we return to this issue later). 
  OSHA may affect injuries through several possible mechanisms (Mendeloff (1979)).  
The agency enforces a set of safety and health standards and may create new standards.  It 
also provides information to employers and employees, both directly through consultations 
and training activities and through the provision of educational materials.  Most of OSHA’s 
resources are devoted to its enforcement program.  Inspections, backed up by the threat of 
penalties for non-compliance, may push employers to comply with standards or even to 
improve their overall safety programs.  The threat of inspection may also generate 
compliance actions in order to avoid expected penalties.  Even though most workplaces are 
inspected infrequently, especially in industries with low injury rates, the ability of workers 
to request OSHA inspections enhances their potential deterrent effect. 
  Equation (1) below summarizes a variety of factors that may influence the riskiness 
of working at plant i in year t (RISKit).  We begin with the inherent hazardousness of the 
plant which may change over time (HAZARDit), the average experience or inexperience of 
the plant’s workforce (EXPERit), and the degree of worker fatigue (FATIGUEit).  In 
addition we have three factors affecting the attention paid by the plant to safety issues. The 
degree of general deterrence achieved by OSHA inspections at other plants in the same area 




expected penalty for a violation (with penalty and probability getting equal weight if the 
firm is risk-neutral).  There may be a separate impact of current or past inspections 
happening at this specific plant (INSPit-s), either because having an inspection leads the plant 
to revise its expectations on the probability of future inspections or because OSHA follows 
up some inspections to ensure that hazards are corrected, with the possibility of much higher 
‘failure to abate’ penalties.  ATTENit includes any other factors such as plant unionization 
or workers compensation costs which could affect attention to safety.   
 
(1)   RISKit = f(HAZARDit, EXPERit, FATIGUEit, GENit, INSPit-s, ATTENit). 
 
  The actual number of injuries occurring in a workplace in a given year will depend 
strongly on the underlying riskiness, along with some random error term.  These errors may 
be greater (in percentage terms) in smaller workplaces. To the extent that unusually high 
injuries at time t-1 leads to increased attention to safety issues at time t, we would expect 
some degree of negative autocorrelation in the unobserved random element of injuries.   
 
3. Data and Econometric Issues 
 
  The basic sample universe for the data sets has remained unchanged from the 
original Scholz and Gray data set:  establishments that are in manufacturing industries and 
are located in states where OSHA has primary enforcement responsibility  (the 29 “Federal-
OSHA” states, which include about 60% of the national work force).  Manufacturing 
workplaces have long been a focus of OSHA activity and are longer-lived and better-defined 




OSHA inspections to affect injuries over several years.  Information on injuries at the 
establishments is merged with characteristics of OSHA inspections at those establishments 
to create the analysis data sets. 
  Our injury data comes from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Survey of 
Occupational Injuries and Illnesses which gathers data for hundreds of thousands of 
establishments each year in a stratified sampling process that results in larger establishments 
being more likely to be in the sample.  Since we look at changes in an establishment’s 
injuries over time we focus on those establishments that have BLS injury data for 
consecutive years.  This necessarily results in large establishments being over-represented in 
our data sets, relative to all manufacturing establishments.  We use the total number of lost-
workday injuries during the year as our injury measure. Earlier work with the first two data 
sets also examined a measure of the seriousness of the injuries, the total number of days of 
work lost due to injuries at the plant; but that information is not present in the revised 
version of the BLS Survey which was begun in 1992.   
  The BLS data is combined with information on OSHA inspections from OSHA’s 
Integrated Management Information System (IMIS).  Our key measure of inspection activity 
(in addition to the year of the inspection) is whether or not a penalty was imposed.
1   We 
consider only two types of inspections: programmed  inspections, targeted by OSHA based 
on industry hazardousness, and complaint inspections, where OSHA is responding to a 
written worker complaint.  These two types account for over 80% of all inspections during 
the time period studied.
2  For almost all of the period examined in this paper, OSHA 
targeted its programmed inspections by first identifying all establishments that were in 4-
                                                           
1 As reported in Scholz and Gray (1990), having a serious violation cited during the inspection is essentially 




digit SICs with rates above a state’s manufacturing average (Siskind (1993)).  Then, it chose 
inspection sites randomly within this set, excluding only those workplaces with fewer than 
11 workers or those where OSHA had conducted a comprehensive inspection within the 
previous 2 years.  Complaint inspections were initiated by a written (formal) or oral 
(informal) notice from a worker (or a union representative) about an alleged violation or 
hazard at a workplace 
  The OSHA and BLS records were linked together, using name and address 
information to identify records that referred to the same establishment in a technique 
developed by Fellegi and Sunter (1969)  that calculates the probabilities of two records 
matching, based on agreement or disagreement on their characteristics.  The matching 
methodology is explained in more detail in Gray (1996).  
Since our analysis focuses on injury changes, two consecutive years of BLS data are 
needed to generate one observation for analysis.  Table 1 describes some features of the 3 
data sets.  The original Scholz and Gray data set was restricted to those manufacturing 
establishments which had BLS injury data available for all 7 of the years from 1979 and 
1985, but a broader definition was needed in the later samples due to substantial cuts in the 
BLS Survey sample size later in the 1980s.  The 1987-91 dataset included all plants with at 
least 2 consecutive years of BLS Survey data; the 1992-98 dataset includes all plants with at 
least 3 consecutive years.  If we had instead insisted on 7 years of BLS Survey data in 1992-
98, the size distribution would have been seriously skewed:  of the 860 establishments with 
7 years of data, only 21 had fewer than 100 employees and only 60 had fewer than 250.  
This would have precluded any analysis of OSHA’s impact in those smaller size groups 
which receive the majority of OSHA inspections.  
                                                                                                                                                                                  






  The basic model estimated by Scholz and Gray took the following form: 
(2) DINJi t = at + b0INSPi t + b1INSPi t-1 + b2INSPi t-2 + b3INSPi t-3 +  
c1DEMPit + c2DHRSit + SIC2i + uit 
 
The dependent variable (DINJ) is the log of the change in the number of injuries, so the 
coefficients show the impact on the percentage change in injuries.  Gray and Scholz (1993) 
report extensive tests with alternative specifications.  Since OSHA targets inspections at 
high-injury-rate establishments, regressions of injury levels on inspections show a positive 
(endogenous) relationship.  They find that using injury changes greatly reduces the 
endogeneity problem, and we follow this specification.  
Our focus is on the specific deterrence impact of OSHA inspections at this particular 
plant.  This impact is captured with four inspection dummies (from INSPit to INSPit-3), so 
the 1983-84 change in injuries depends on four years of inspections (from 1981 to 1984).  
An alternative OSHA measure, IPEN, refers to inspections which imposed a penalty 
(following Scholz and Gray (1990)).  In some models we allow for different impacts for 
different inspection types, IPRG and ICMP for any programmed and complaint inspections, 
and IPRGP and ICMPP for programmed and complaint inspections imposing penalties. 
  Relating the other explanatory factors to those in Equation (1), we use changes in 
employment (DEMPit) to measure changes in the experience of the workforce and changes 
in hours (DHRSit) to measure changes in worker fatigue. To the extent that innate 




form.  Trends in industry hazardousness or changes in general deterrence are measured by 
industry dummies (SIC2i).  In some of our analyses we allow for differences in the impacts 
of OSHA inspections for establishments in different employment size categories (1-99, 100-
249, 250-499, and 500+).  When we do so, we include three employment size dummies in 
the regressions.  
In some models we estimate different impacts of OSHA inspections for each 2-digit 
SIC industry in each period.  We then compare the estimated impacts with three different 
industry-specific factors.  First is the extent of general deterrence, measured by the number 
of OSHA inspections per 1000 production workers in the federal OSHA states.
3 Second is 
the industry hazardousness, measured by the industry lost workday injury rate (taken from 
the BLS web site, www.bls.gov).  Third is the industry’s new capital investment divided by 
its existing capital stock, since newer machinery is expected to be safer.
4 
 
  One issue that arises when comparing the results here with the published results of 
the earlier studies is the choice of estimation method.  All of the results presented here are 
based on ordinary least squares regressions.  Earlier studies (such as Scholz and Gray 
(1990)) allowed for autoregressive errors, recognizing the possibility that shocks to injuries 
in one year might increase attention to safety, generating negative autocorrelation or 
regression to the mean in the injury generating process.  We experimented with estimating 
an autoregressive model with the newest data set, and found that while the autoregressive 
terms were estimated to be significant, the results for the inspection variables were 
essentially unchanged from those reported here (results available on request). 
                                                           
3  OSHA inspection totals from website: http://www/osha.gov.  Data on production workers from Employment 
and Earnings, various issues. 
4 The data came from the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database, which contains data only through 




More importantly, some of the earlier analyses of data from 1979-85 and 1987-91 
used a ‘Chamberlain’ model (Chamberlain (1982, 1984)), which allows for the possibility 
that inspection targeting leads the set of plants selected for inspections to include more 
plants with poor performance in terms of injury growth (Gray and Scholz (1993), Gray 
(1996)).  Correcting for this selection effect results in a greater (negative) impact of 
inspections on injury growth, with the model concluding that the inspected plants would 
have done even worse if they had not been inspected.  In the earlier research, using the 
Chamberlain method increased the estimated impact of an inspection with penalty in the 
1979-1985 period by 7%, from 15% to 22%.  Using the 1987-1991 period the comparable 
impact also rose by 7%, from 8% to 15%. 
Preliminary estimates of the Chamberlain model for the most recent period suggest a 
similar impact (the reduction in injuries after a penalty inspection increases in magnitude 
from about 1% using ordinary regression to about 7% using the Chamberlain model).  Thus 
the comparison across time periods gives a similar conclusion to the ordinary regression 
results presented here, with a substantial reduction in the impact of an inspection with 
penalty between Period 1 and Period 3.  We concentrate on ordinary regression results in 
this paper primarily because the Chamberlain estimation method requires complete injury 
data, and hence can only be calculated for a small and unrepresentative minority of the 
plants in the 1992-1998 period (860 plants, nearly all of them in the larger size categories, 





4. Results  
  Table 1 presents the means of the variables in the three data sets.  There is a decline 
in injuries over time (negative DINJ) within each of the three data sets.  However, this does 
not mean that rates declined continuously from Period 1 to Period 3.  Each period happens 
to begin when rates were fairly high and end when they were lower. The establishment size 
distribution differs somewhat between the three data sets, based on changes in the BLS 
Survey coverage and the number of years of injury data required for inclusion.  The period 2 
data set contains more small plants, since it only required two consecutive years of injury 
data; the latest data set contains a higher proportion of large plants, due to the steady 
shrinkage in the BLS Survey sample size. 
  Table 1 also reveals some substantial changes in OSHA inspection activity across 
the three data sets.  In the earliest data set there were relatively high rates of inspections 
(INSP), especially programmed inspections (IPRG).  These inspections commonly failed to 
impose penalties; only about one-third of all years with inspections had any inspections that 
imposed penalties (IPEN), but in the later two periods this ratio was reversed.  This pattern 
can be explained by the existence of “records-check” inspections during the early 1980s; 
these inspections began with a check of the plant’s injury rate records and stopped there if 
the plant’s injury rate was below the average rate for manufacturing (Siskind (1993)).  This 
led to a large set of programmed inspections that did not impose a penalty (and did not 
perform a ‘real’ inspection of the workplace). 
  There was also some variation in the composition of inspections across the periods.  
Because of the prevalence of programmed inspections (IPRG) in the first period, they 




probability of a complaint inspection rose slightly (to .07), while the probability of a 
programmed inspection fell dramatically (to .03).  There was also an increase in the fraction 
of complaint inspections which imposed penalties (ICMPP) over time, though not as 
dramatic as the increase noted above for programmed inspections (IPRGP). 
  Table 2 shows the basic regressions of injury changes on inspections and inspections 
with penalty.  The first column presents results from the original Scholz and Gray data set 
from 1979-85.  The second and third columns present results from the 1987-91 and 1992-98 
data sets.  As expected, growth in employment and hours worked increases the number of 
injuries. Perhaps due to the ‘random’ nature of workplace accidents, the models only 
explain about 12% of the variance in injury changes across plants in the earlier two periods, 
declining to about 9% in the latest period. 
As found in the Scholz and Gray analysis, inspections with penalties have a larger 
impact than other inspections (comparing IPEN with INSP).  The main result in Table 2 is 
that both IPEN and INSP coefficients became smaller in each succeeding period.  Adding 
up the cumulative IPEN effect in each period, it declines from 15.7% to 9.4%, then to 1.4%, 
with the last period’s impact not statistically significant.  We also combined data from all 3 
periods in order to formally compare the IPEN coefficients across periods.  The results (not 
shown) confirm that the Period 3 results are significantly different from those in Period 1. 
  In Table 3 we see the impact of combining the four years of OSHA inspections into 
a single variable.  IPENX shows the average impact of an inspection over a four year period, 
so the cumulative impact is falling from 19.2% to 12.0% to 1.2% across the three periods.  
Comparable regressions for each period including both IPENX and inspections with no 




  The initial regression results presented in Tables 2 and 3 provide evidence of a 
substantial decline in the measured impact of OSHA inspections on manufacturing 
industries.  We now consider different categories of inspections and establishments to see 
how widespread the decline is.  Looking at inspection type, Scholz and Gray (1997) found 
that both complaint and programmed inspections affected injuries, but that complaint 
inspections were less dependent on penalties for their impact.  Table 4 shows the impact of 
complaint and programmed inspections on injuries in each of the periods, confirming that 
programmed inspections are more dependent on penalties for their impact.  The impact of 
complaint inspections with penalties declines more in the 1980s, while the impact of 
programmed inspections with penalties declines more in the 1990s.  However, these 
differences between the inspection types were not statistically significant.  
  Next we allow the impact of OSHA inspections to differ depending on 
characteristics of the establishment.  Table 5 examines the effects of inspections with 
penalties in 4 different establishment employment size categories:  small, under 100; 
medium, 100-249; big, 250-499; and very big, over 500.  We find much weaker preventive 
effects of inspections in the largest establishments compared to the smaller establishments 
(similar to results reported in Gray and Scholz (1991)).  As expected, the model does a 
better job of explaining the variation in number of injuries for larger workplaces.  More 
importantly we have declines in the estimated impact across the periods for nearly all cases, 
and always smaller impacts in Period 3 than in Period 1.  The timing of the decline varies 
across size classes, but the decline is statistically significant for all but the medium plants.   
Next we allowed for different OSHA impacts across different industries, shown in 




between IPENX and two-digit SIC manufacturing industry dummies.  Each interaction term 
provides an estimate of the effect at an establishment in that industry of having at least 1 
inspection with penalty over a four year period.  There are a few significant industry 
coefficients, but there is no industry where the effect of inspections with penalties is 
significant in more than one period.  Not surprisingly, there is no significant correlation 
across industries in their coefficients for different periods. 
Table 7 tests whether these industry-period coefficients are correlated with three 
factors that might affect OSHA’s impact:  the average lost workday injury rate in the 
industry (bigger effects if there are more injuries per worker to prevent), the average 
inspection rate in the industry (smaller effects when firms are expecting OSHA inspections), 
and the average investment rate in the industry (smaller effects where there is newer, safer 
machinery).  These correlations are relatively small, and only two approach significance.  
For industry coefficients based on all workplaces, higher investment rates were weakly 
linked to smaller inspection impacts.   Looking at workplaces with fewer than 250 workers 
(where the effects were relatively larger in the last period), the link with investment rates 
disappears but a weak negative relationship appears with the industry inspection rate.   
  Finally, we consider the possibility that OSHA inspections have different impacts on 
different types of injuries. Table 8 shows the results for our basic model, separated into 
cases with days away from work (DAW) and cases with only restricted work activity 
(RWA).  One clear finding is that, even in Period 1, all of the impact of inspections with 
penalties was on DAW injuries.  There was no impact on RWA injuries.  In Period 2, there 
is even some indication that inspections were linked to increases in RWA injuries, but this 





5. Discussion and Conclusions 
 
The initial regression results presented in Tables 2 and 3 provide evidence of a 
substantial decline between 1979 and 1998 in the measured impact of OSHA inspections on 
manufacturing industries: from a 15% reduction over the three years after an inspection with 
penalty in Period 1, to a 1% reduction in Period 3.  In this section we consider several 
possible explanations for the decline, based on changes in OSHA policy and injury reporting 
during this time, and relate them to our statistical results. 
One explanation for the decline could be a composition effect, with the data for 
Period 3 inspections containing more observations where OSHA’s impact is small.  Table 5 
does show a smaller impact for large plants, which are more common in our data for Period 
3 than they were in Period 1.  This turns out to be offset by shifts in other groups, so the 
predicted average impact is actually higher in Period 3.
5  More importantly, the results for 
all subgroups of the data show that the decline in OSHA’s impact is wide-spread, affecting 
different inspection types, plant sizes, and industries, so it is unlikely that any composition 
effects could tell the whole story.  
Other explanations for the decline could arise from measurement issues.  During 
most of Period 1 (1981-86) OSHA inspectors on programmed inspections followed a 
“records- check” procedure: first checking a workplace’s lost workday injury and illness 
rate, and terminating the inspection if the rate was below the manufacturing average.  Such 
“records-only” inspections never imposed penalties, so firms wishing to avoid OSHA 
                                                           
5 The predicted impact was obtained by multiplying the Period 1 coefficients for each size group in Table 5 by 





inspections had an incentive to under-report injuries.  Ruser and Smith (1988, 1991) found 
evidence that lost workday rates fell for some plants subject to these inspections, but only 
for uninspected establishments.  This would lead our results to understate (not overstate) the 
impact of inspections on injuries in the earlier period. 
  Injury reporting might also have been affected by OSHA’s “egregious case” policy, 
which started levying extremely large and highly publicized fines for recordkeeping 
violations in 1986; if underreporting declined more at inspected establishments than 
uninspected ones this would translate into a smaller observed OSHA impact.  Still, this 
seems unlikely to have played a large role in the observed decline, since it would explain 
only the Period 2 changes, not the continuing decline in Period 3. 
Another reason why OSHA’s records-check policy might affect our cross-period 
comparison is that plants with penalty inspections would include a disproportionate number 
with unusually high pre-inspection injury rates (since they weren’t records-only).  These 
high rates might then be expected to decline in the years following the inspection (a 
phenomenon known as “regression to the mean”).  Scholz and Gray (1990) account for this 
using a model with autoregressive errors and find that there was evidence of negative 
autoregression (consistent with regression to the mean), but that the estimated OSHA 
impacts were not affected.  As noted earlier, we also examined autoregressive models and 
found they didn’t affect our results.  Even if regression to the mean led us to overstate our 
Period 1 results, that should have led the decline in OSHA’s impact in later periods to be 
concentrated in the results for programmed inspections, and to happen by Period 2.  Table 4 




subject to the records-check policy; the decline in impact for programmed inspections 
doesn’t come until the 1990s, well after the records-check policy was being discontinued. 
A final reporting issue arises due to the steady growth since the mid-1980s in the 
percentage of lost workday injuries that are classified as “restricted work activity” cases 
rather than as cases with “days away from work.”  As Figure 1 showed, the rate of RWA 
cases grew very slowly until the mid 1980s, then almost doubled in the 2 years from 1986 to 
1988 and continued growing at over 10% per year until 1995.  Thus by 1996 about ½ of all 
lost workday cases in manufacturing did not involve days away from work.  We saw in 
Table 8 that in every period, even 1979-85, OSHA inspections with penalties had no 
preventive impact on the percentage change in the number of RWA injuries.  Based on an 
assumption of zero impact on RWA cases, over one-third of the drop in OSHA’s impact 
could be accounted for by the growth of RWA cases. Of course, this is an explanation only 
in an accounting sense; it provides no causal insights about why RWA cases have not been 
affected.  Indeed, since the growth in RWA cases in the more recent periods presumably 
comes from cases that formerly would have been DAW cases, it is a puzzle why they are not 
affected similarly by OSHA inspections. 
We now turn to explanations for the decline in OSHA’s impact that do not rely on 
reporting changes or mismeasurement issues.   A large increase in general deterrence could 
in theory weaken the impact of specific deterrence that we measure, but the evidence in 
Table 7 goes the other way: higher industry inspection rates are associated with more 
negative (larger) inspection-specific impacts.  This reversed sign (if believable) could 
explain a small part of the decline in impact by the 1990s, when the number of inspections 




Another possible explanation is declining marginal effectiveness of repeated 
inspections at the same workplace. Evidence for this has been found in past research (Weil 
(2001), Gray and Jones (1991)).  Since larger establishments are inspected more frequently, 
the greater erosion in effectiveness that we find in the largest size group from Period 1 to 
Period 2 and then in the next largest from Period 2 to Period 3 is consistent with declining 
marginal effectiveness.  The problem with this explanation is that OSHA had been 
conducting inspections for nearly a decade before our Period 1, and the declining impact of 
repeated inspections is most pronounced in the first few inspections, so most of the decline 
in impact at large, frequently inspected plants should have already occurred by the start of 
our data in 1979. 
A somewhat different explanation for declining effectiveness of inspections could be 
that the standards that OSHA enforces have become less relevant to injury prevention over 
time.  Most of these standards date from the 1960s or earlier.  Changes in manufacturing 
technologies may have left many of the standards outdated or irrelevant.   As a result, we 
could find either that fewer violations are being detected or that inspections are relevant to a 
shrinking percentage of injuries.  The number of violations cited per manufacturing 
inspection was substantially lower in the first period (2.4) than in the latter two periods (5.2 
and 4.7), contradicting the first of these predictions.  The second is harder to assess.  The 
results in Table 7 on investment rates provide a bit of support, since high-investment 
industries (with newer, safer equipment) show a smaller impact from OSHA inspections, but 
the effect disappears for those establishments with fewer than 250 workers (the only size 




Rising costs for workers’ compensation may have stimulated employers to increase 
their efforts to a) prevent injuries, b) discourage workers from making claims, and c) 
manage the disability process more closely to reduce the costs of claims.  The costs of 
workers’ compensation benefits per days away from work injury rose steadily during the 
1980s and peaked in the early 1990s (Statistical Abstract (2001)). Greater attention to 
workplace safety due to workers’ compensation programs may diminish the extra incentives 
provided by OSHA inspections, but the impact of worker compensation should be on 
injuries in general, rather than on injuries connected to OSHA standards.  Since 1992, the 
reduction in days away from work injuries (the only category for which we have injury type 
data) occurred fairly uniformly across different injury types in manufacturing, as shown in 
Table 9.  To the extent that there were differences, the injury types generally believed to be 
more related to standards such as “caught-in” injuries and falls from heights had less of a 
decline than those believed to be less related to standards such as “bodily reaction” 
(overexertion) injuries. This is consistent with a hypothesis that general financial incentives 
like workers’ compensation, rather than inspections, were responsible for the injury decline.  
Finally, there may have been some changes in what actually goes on during 
inspections.  In the 1990s, especially after mid-1995, OSHA management de-emphasized 
the importance of numerical measures of inspection activities (e.g., violations cited).  It 
placed more emphasis on problem solving and being more creative in encouraging firms to 
reduce workplace hazards.  This has led overall to fewer inspections taking more hours of 
inspector time.  These changes might have been expected to make individual inspections 




After examining a variety of reasons for the decline in impact of OSHA inspections 
on injuries, we have only found partial explanations.  Some possibilities, such as changes in 
data composition, OSHA’s records-check policy, and general deterrence, explain very little 
or even go the other way.  The growth in restricted work activity injuries can explain one-
third of the decline in an accounting sense, but this doesn’t explain why these injuries are 
less affected.  The increases in workers’ compensation costs in the 1980s may have led 
employers to pay more attention to safety hazards, reducing the incremental incentives to 
improve safety provided by OSHA inspections.  We plan to explore these issues further with 
more detailed analyses of the 1992-98 data, where we can test OSHA’s impact on specific 
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   1979-1985      1987-1991   1992-1998 
 
Number of Observations  27,368  32,765  25,603 
Number of Plants    6,842  14,386    8,161 
Plants in BLS Dataset for all years    6,842    3,118       860 
Required Continuous Years of BLS Data  7 years  2 years  3 years 
 
Variable Means by Period 
 
   1979-1985      1987-1991   1992-1998 
 
Continuous Variables       
DINJ  log change in injuries   -0.046  -0.029  -0.043    
DHOUR  log change in hours  -0.024  -0.032  -0.011    
DNUM  log change in employment  -0.046  -0.029  -0.043    
DDAW   log change in DAW injuries  -0.075  -0.029  -0.082   
DRWA   log change in RWA injuries   0.036   0.059   0.040 
 
Employment Size       
SMALL  employment <100  0.196  0.325  0.221    
MEDIUM  employment 100-249  0.332  0.300  0.222    
BIG  employment 250-499  0.239  0.181  0.240    
VERY BIG  employment 500+  0.232  0.194  0.316    
 
OSHA Inspection Dummy Variables (years t through t-3) 
INSP  any inspection in year   0.244  0.119  0.082    
IPEN  any penalty inspection   0.080  0.082  0.052   
IPRG   programmed inspection   0.193  0.045  0.026    
ICMP complaint  inspection  0.061  0.073  0.069   
IPRGP  programmed with penalty  0.063  0.035  0.034    
ICMPP  complaint with penalty  0.018  0.046  0.035   
 
OSHA Combined  Inspections – (Value of Any of the 4 lagged dummy variables equal 1)   
INSPX   INSP-INSPL3  0.625  0.383  0.258    
IPENX   IPEN-IPENL3  0.283  0.245  0.194   
IPRGX   IPRG-IPRGL3  0.522  0.228  0.112   
ICMPX ICMP-ICMPL3  0.229  0.207  0.171     
IPRGPX IPRGP-IPRGPL3  0.221  0.141  0.093   
ICMPPX ICMPP-ICMPPL3  0.086  0.124  0.113
        
        






Impact of OSHA Inspections on Injuries 
(current and last 3 years) 
 
PERIOD  1979-85 1987-91 1992-98  1979-85 1987-91  1992-98 
 
INTERCEP -0.097  0.088  -0.044  -0.094  0.087  -0.045 
 (-6.91)  (6.63)  (-2.92)  (-6.53)  (6.46)  (-2.97) 
 
IPEN -0.058  0.004  -0.002       
 (-4.09)  (0.33)  (-0.13)       
 
IPENL1  -0.046 -0.036 0.010       
  (-3.22) (-2.76) (0.58)       
 
IPENL2  -0.048 -0.016 -0.016       
  (-3.46) (-1.18) (-0.97)       
 
IPENL3  -0.005 -0.046 -0.006       
  (-0.42) (-3.37) (-0.38)       
 
INSP      -0.019  0.014  0.01 
      (-2.13)  (1.28)  (0.67) 
 
INSPL1      -0.025  -0.023  0.006 
      (-2.76)  (-2.19)  (0.43) 
 
INSPL2      -0.024  0.003  -0.012 
      (-2.63)  (0.28)  (-0.84) 
 
INSPL3      (-0.005)  (-0.025)  (-0.008) 
      -0.52  -2.61  -0.55 
 
DEMP  0.451 0.391 0.447  0.452 0.391  0.447 
  (16.36) (18.82) (20.25)  (16.39) (18.81)  (20.25) 
 
DHOUR  0.362 0.291 0.172  0.38  0.291  0.172 
  (16.43) (16.48) (9.52)  (16.37) (16.48)  (9.52) 
 
R
2  0.116 0.116 0.088  0.115 0.116  0.088 
 
 







Impact of OSHA Inspections on Injuries 
(any in current or last 3 years)  
 
 
PERIOD  1979-85 1987-91 1992-98  1979-85  1987-91  1992-98 
 
INTERCEP -0.096  0.089  -0.045  -0.096  0.087  -0.047 
       (-6.86)  (6.68)  (-2.95)  (-6.49)  (6.38)  (-3.07) 
 
IPENX  -0.048 -0.030 -0.003       
  (-5.47) (-3.63) (-0.27)       
 
INSPX      -0.026  -0.013  0.003 
      (-3.15)  (-1.72)  (0.37) 
 
DEMP  0.451 0.392 0.447  0.452  0.392  0.447 
  (16.36) (18.85) (20.26)  (16.39)  (18.84)  (20.26) 
 
DHOUR 0.381 0.291 0.172  0.381  0.291  0.172 
  (16.41) (16.47) (9.52)  (16.38)  (16.47)  (9.52) 
 
R
2  0.116 0.116 0.088  0.115  0.115  0.088 
 
 









Impact of OSHA Inspections by Inspection Type 
 
 
PERIOD  1979-85 1987-91 1992-98  1979-85  1987-91  1992-98 
 
INTERCEP -0.096  0.089  -0.044  -0.096  0.087  -0.046 
       (-6.88)  (6.71)  (-2.90)  (-6.56)  (6.38)  (-3.01) 
 
IPRGPX  -0.043 -0.035 -0.005       
  (-4.55) (-3.38) (-0.36)       
 
ICMPPX -0.043 -0.019 -0.005       
  (-3.15) (-1.73) (-0.43)       
 
IPRGX      -0.016  -0.010  0.004 
      (-2.00)  (-1.18)  (0.28) 
 
ICMPX      -0.033  -0.012  -0.001 
      (-3.55)  (-1.36)  (0.10) 
 
DEMP  0.451 0.392 0.447  0.451  0.392  0.447 
  (16.36) (18.86) (20.26)  (16.35)  (18.84)  (20.26) 
 
DHOUR 0.381 0.291 0.172  0.381  0.291  0.172 
  (16.40) (16.47) (9.53)  (16.38)  (16.47)  (9.52) 
 
R
2  0.116 0.116 0.088  0.115  0.115  0.088 
 
 








Impact of OSHA Inspections by Employment Size 
 
 
   SMALL  MEDIUM  BIG   VERY  BIG 
   <100   100-249 250-499 500+ 
   
INTERCEPT   -0.045   -0.117   -0.105   -0.117 
   (-1.77)   (-5.88)   (-5.19)   (-6.19) 
 
IPENX   1979-85  -0.063   -0.037   -0.058   -0.034 
   (-2.78)   (-2.39)   (-3.46)   (-2.23) 
 
IPENX   1987-91  -0.033   -0.021   -0.057   -0.020 
   (-1.87)   (-1.36)   (-3.16)   (-1.30) 
 
IPENX    1992-98  0.006   -0.029   0.003   0.010   
(0.22)   (-1.24)   (0.16)   (0.71) 
 
DEMP    0.361   0.469   0.466   0.449 
   (14.21)   (17.35)   (15.30)   (18.18) 
 
DHOUR   0.174   0.319   0.324   0.348 
   (8.64)   (14.08)   (12.59)   (15.94) 
 
R
2    .067   .111   .120   .150 
 




Note:  ‘t’ statistics in parentheses; regressions include year and SIC2 dummies. 






Impact of OSHA Inspections by Industry 
 
PERIOD 1979-85  1987-91  1992-98 
 
SIC20PENX -0.050    0.025  -0.021       
 (-2.18)    (1.09)  (-0.80)       
SIC22PENX -0.073  -0.006    0.026       
 (-1.52)  (-0.13)    (0.38)       
SIC23PENX -0.080  -0.078  -0.050       
 (-1.10)  (-1.35)  (-0.93)       
SIC24PENX -0.012  -0.101  -0.008       
 (-0.41)  (-3.88)  (-0.21)       
SIC25PENX -0.058  -0.016    0.027       
 (-1.44)  (-0.41)    (0.56)       
SIC26PENX   0.026  -0.007  0.019       
   (0.77)  (-0.18)   (0.44)       
SIC27PENX -0.099  -0.045  -0.084       
 (-1.78)  (-0.93)  (-1.69)       
SIC28PENX -0.014    0.008  -0.047       
 (-0.38)    (0.16)  (-0.89)       
SIC29PENX -0.073  -0.033  -0.104       
 (-1.06)  (-0.41)  (-1.01)       
SIC30PENX -0.058  -0.061    0.010       
 (-1.34)  (-1.83)    (0.26)       
SIC31PENX -0.097  -0.079  -0.059       
 (-1.68)  (-1.20)  (-0.78)       
SIC32PENX  -0.094   0.004   0.059       
  (-2.92)   (0.14)   (1.22)       
SIC33PENX -0.105  -0.031  -0.015       
 (-3.98)  (-1.20)  (-0.45)       
SIC34PENX -0.030  -0.041  -0.002       
 (-1.44)  (-2.10)  (-0.05)       
SIC35PENX -0.071  -0.040  -0.003       
 (-3.05)  (-1.64)  (-0.09)       
SIC36PENX -0.064  -0.066    0.044       
 (-1.88)  (-1.91)    (1.15)       
SIC37PENX   0.022  -0.038   0.044       
   (0.63)  (-1.21)   (1.23)       
SIC38PENX   0.023   0.073   0.026       
   (0.29)   (1.04)   (0.45)       
SIC39PENX -0.012    0.005  -0.037       
 (-0.28)    (0.91)  (-0.80)       
 
Note:  ‘t’ statistics in parentheses; coefficients from one regression combining all 3 periods.  






Correlations of Industry-Specific Inspection Effects with Other Variables 
 
 
    Industry Industry Industry 
    Investment   Lost Workday Inspection 
    Rate   Injury  Rate Rate 
 
 
Inspection  Impact   .22   .05   -.05 
by  Industry    (.11)   (.71)   (.73) 
(all establishments) 
 
Inspection  Impact   -.05   .02   -.21 




Notes:   
‘p’ values in parentheses. 
Inspection impact by industry measured by coefficients in Table 6  
(and similar estimates for the subsample of establishments with employment<250).   







Impact of OSHA Inspections on Injury Types: 
Days Away from Work (DAW) vs. Restricted Work Activity (RWA) 
 
   DAW Rate   RWA Rate 
 
INTERCEPT   -0.120    0.069   
(-11.08)     (6.35) 
 
IPENX  1979-85  -0.050    -0.003 
   (-5.62)    (0.29) 
 
IPENX  1987-91  -0.038    0.017 
(-4.50)    (2.01) 
 
IPENX  1992-98  -0.014    0.004 
(-1.33)    (0.35) 
 
DEMP    0.413    0.161 
(29.98)    (11.60) 
 
DHOUR   0.233    0.107 
(20.28)    (9.26) 
 
R
2    .086    .016 
 
N    84,993    84,993 
    
 
Notes:  ‘t’ statistics in parentheses; regressions include year and SIC2 dummies.   





Declines in Specific Injury Types, 1992-98 
 
 Total  A  B  C  Sum 
       A + B + C  
 All  Bodily  Falls  Struck 
 Injuries  Reaction  Same-level  Against 
 
1992  352.1 163.8 25.4  27.3  216.5 
 
1998  204.9  92.8 17.0  15.5 125.3 
 
Decrease 




  D E F  G H  Sum 
         D+E+F+G+H 
 Caught  Falls  Struck    Eye Harmful 
 In  Lower-level  By  abrasions  exposures 
 
1992  27.5 11.6 47.0  8.8  18.1  113.0 
 
1998  18.6  6.9 29.5  4.6 10.0  69.6 
 
Decrease 
(%)  32% 41% 37%  48% 45%  38% 
 
 
Note:   
Event types A, B, and C were identified by OSHA staff as those less likely to have injuries 
related to OSHA standards.  The case is strongest for category A. 
 
Event types D, E, F, G, and H were identified as types more likely to have injuries related to 
OSHA standards.  The case is strongest for categories D and G. 
 







Changes in the Manufacturing Lost Workday Injury Rate per 100 Full-time 
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